Part 5. Principles of Criminal Culpability

The following definitions are applicable to the determination of culpability requirements for offenses defined in this code:
(1) “Act” means a bodily movement, and includes words and possession of property.
(2) “Conduct” means an act or omission and its accompanying state of mind or, where relevant, a series of acts or omissions.
(3) “Criminal negligence”. A person acts with criminal negligence when, through a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise, he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a result will occur or that a circumstance exists.
(4) “Culpable mental state” means intentionally, or with intent, or knowingly, or willfully, or recklessly, or with criminal negligence, as these terms are defined in this section.
(5) “Intentionally” or “with intent”. All offenses defined in this code in which the mental culpability requirement is expressed as “intentionally” or “with intent” are declared to be specific intent offenses. A person acts “intentionally” or “with intent” when his conscious objective is to cause the specific result proscribed by the statute defining the offense. It is immaterial to the issue of specific intent whether or not the result actually occurred.
(6) “Knowingly” or “willfully”. All offenses defined in this code in which the mental culpability requirement is expressed as “knowingly” or “willfully” are declared to be general intent crimes. A person acts “knowingly” or “willfully” with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstance exists. A person acts “knowingly” or “willfully”, with respect to a result of his conduct, when he is aware that his conduct is practically certain to cause the result.
(7) “Omission” means a failure to perform an act as to which a duty of performance is imposed by law.
(8) “Recklessly”. A person acts recklessly when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a result will occur or that a circumstance exists.
(9) “Voluntary act” means an act performed consciously as a result of effort or determination, and includes the possession of property if the actor was aware of his physical possession or control thereof for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate it.

The minimum requirement for criminal liability is the performance by a person of conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act which he is physically capable of performing. If that conduct is all that is required for commission of a particular offense, or if an offense or some material element thereof does not require a culpable mental state on the part of the actor, the offense is one of “strict liability”. If a culpable mental state on the part of the actor is required with respect to any material element of an offense, the offense is one of “mental culpability”.

(1) If the criminality of conduct depends on a child being younger than eighteen years of age and the child was in fact at least fifteen years of age, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant reasonably believed the child to be eighteen years of age or older. This affirmative defense shall not be available if the criminality of conduct depends on the defendant being in a position of trust.
(2) If the criminality of conduct depends on a child's being younger than eighteen years of age and the child was in fact younger than fifteen years of age, there shall be no defense that the defendant reasonably believed the child was eighteen years of age or older.
(3) If the criminality of conduct depends on a child being younger than fifteen years of age, it shall be no defense that the defendant did not know the child's age or that the defendant reasonably believed the child to be fifteen years of age or older.

(1) When the commission of an offense, or some element of an offense, requires a particular culpable mental state, that mental state is ordinarily designated by use of the terms “intentionally”, “with intent”, “knowingly”, “willfully”, “recklessly”, or “criminal negligence” or by use of the terms “with intent to defraud” and “knowing it to be false” describing a specific kind of intent or knowledge.
(2) Although no culpable mental state is expressly designated in a statute defining an offense, a culpable mental state may nevertheless be required for the commission of that offense, or with respect to some or all of the material elements thereof, if the proscribed conduct necessarily involves such a culpable mental state.
(3) If a statute provides that criminal negligence suffices to establish an element of an offense, that element also is established if a person acts recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally. If recklessness suffices to establish an element, that element also is established if a person acts knowingly or intentionally. If acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, that element also is established if a person acts intentionally.
(4) When a statute defining an offense prescribes as an element thereof a specified culpable mental state, that mental state is deemed to apply to every element of the offense unless an intent to limit its application clearly appears.

(1) A person is not relieved of criminal liability for conduct because he engaged in that conduct under a mistaken belief of fact, unless:
(a) It negatives the existence of a particular mental state essential to commission of the offense; or
(b) The statute defining the offense or a statute relating thereto expressly provides that a factual mistake or the mental state resulting therefrom constitutes a defense or exemption; or
(c) The factual mistake or the mental state resulting therefrom is of a kind that supports a defense of justification as defined in sections 18-1-701 to 18-1-707.
(2) A person is not relieved of criminal liability for conduct because he engages in that conduct under a mistaken belief that it does not, as a matter of law, constitute an offense, unless the conduct is permitted by one or more of the following:
(a) A statute or ordinance binding in this state;
(b) An administrative regulation, order, or grant of permission by a body or official authorized and empowered to make such order or grant the permission under the laws of the state of Colorado;
(c) An official written interpretation of the statute or law relating to the offense, made or issued by a public servant, agency, or body legally charged or empowered with the responsibility of administering, enforcing, or interpreting a statute, ordinance, regulation, order, or law. If such interpretation is by judicial decision, it must be binding in the state of Colorado.
(3) Any defense authorized by this section is an affirmative defense.

(1) The consent of the victim to conduct charged to constitute an offense or to the result thereof is not a defense unless the consent negatives an element of the offense or precludes the infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.
(2) When conduct is charged to constitute an offense because it causes or threatens bodily injury, consent to that conduct or to the infliction of that injury is a defense only if the bodily injury consented to or threatened by the conduct consented to is not serious, or the conduct and the injury are reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in a lawful athletic contest or competitive sport, or the consent establishes a justification under sections 18-1-701 to 18-1-707.
(3) Unless otherwise provided by this code or by the law defining the offense, assent does not constitute consent if:
(a) It is given by a person who is legally incompetent to authorize the conduct charged to constitute the offense; or
(b) It is given by a person who, by reason of immaturity, behavioral or mental health disorder, or intoxication, is manifestly unable and is known or reasonably should be known by the defendant to be unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the nature or harmfulness of the conduct charged to constitute the offense; or
(c) It is given by a person whose consent is sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense; or
(d) It is induced by force, duress, or deception.
(4) Any defense authorized by this section is an affirmative defense.