Part 7. Justification and Exemptions from Criminal Responsibility

(1) Unless inconsistent with other provisions of sections 18-1-702 to 18-1-710, defining justifiable use of physical force, or with some other provision of law, conduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal when it is required or authorized by a provision of law or a judicial decree binding in Colorado.
(2) A “provision of law” and a “judicial decree” in subsection (1) of this section mean:
(a) Laws defining duties and functions of public servants;
(b) Laws defining duties of private citizens to assist public servants in the performance of certain of their functions;
(c) Laws governing the execution of legal process;
(d) Laws governing the military service and conduct of war;
(e) Judgments and orders of court.

(1) Unless inconsistent with other provisions of sections 18-1-703 to 18-1-707, defining justifiable use of physical force, or with some other provision of law, conduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal when it is necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent public or private injury which is about to occur by reason of a situation occasioned or developed through no conduct of the actor, and which is of sufficient gravity that, according to ordinary standards of intelligence and morality, the desirability and urgency of avoiding the injury clearly outweigh the desirability of avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by the statute defining the offense in issue.
(2) The necessity and justifiability of conduct under subsection (1) of this section shall not rest upon considerations pertaining only to the morality and advisability of the statute, either in its general application or with respect to its application to a particular class of cases arising thereunder. When evidence relating to the defense of justification under this section is offered by the defendant, before it is submitted for the consideration of the jury, the court shall first rule as a matter of law whether the claimed facts and circumstances would, if established, constitute a justification.

(1) The use of physical force upon another person that would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal under any of the following circumstances:
(a) A parent, guardian, or other person entrusted with the care and supervision of a minor or an incompetent person, and a teacher or other person entrusted with the care and supervision of a minor, may use reasonable and appropriate physical force upon the minor or incompetent person when and to the extent it is reasonably necessary and appropriate to maintain discipline or promote the welfare of the minor or incompetent person.
(b) A superintendent or other authorized official of a jail, prison, or correctional institution may, in order to maintain order and discipline, use objectively reasonable and appropriate physical force when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes it necessary to maintain order and discipline, but he or she may use deadly physical force only when he or she objectively reasonably believes the inmate poses an immediate threat to the person using deadly force or another person.
(c) A person responsible for the maintenance of order in a common carrier of passengers, or a person acting under his direction, may use reasonable and appropriate physical force when and to the extent that it is necessary to maintain order and discipline, but he may use deadly physical force only when it is reasonably necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury.
(d) A person acting under a reasonable belief that another person is about to commit suicide or to inflict serious bodily injury upon himself may use reasonable and appropriate physical force upon that person to the extent that it is reasonably necessary to thwart the result.
(e) A duly licensed physician, advanced practice nurse, or a person acting under his or her direction, may use reasonable and appropriate physical force for the purpose of administering a recognized form of treatment that he or she reasonably believes to be adapted to promoting the physical or mental health of the patient if:
(I) The treatment is administered with the consent of the patient, or if the patient is a minor or an incompetent person, with the consent of his parent, guardian, or other person entrusted with his care and supervision; or
(II) The treatment is administered in an emergency when the physician or advanced practice nurse reasonably believes that no one competent to consent can be consulted and that a reasonable person, wishing to safeguard the welfare of the patient, would consent.

(1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, a person is justified in using physical force upon another person in order to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by that other person, and he may use a degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for that purpose.
(2) Deadly physical force may be used only if a person reasonably believes a lesser degree of force is inadequate and:
(a) The actor has reasonable ground to believe, and does believe, that he or another person is in imminent danger of being killed or of receiving great bodily injury; or
(b) The other person is using or reasonably appears about to use physical force against an occupant of a dwelling or business establishment while committing or attempting to commit burglary as defined in sections 18-4-202 to 18-4-204; or
(c) The other person is committing or reasonably appears about to commit kidnapping as defined in section 18-3-301 or 18-3-302, robbery as defined in section 18-4-301 or 18-4-302, sexual assault as set forth in section 18-3-402, or in section 18-3-403 as it existed prior to July 1, 2000, or assault as defined in sections 18-3-202 and 18-3-203.
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, a person is not justified in using physical force if:
(a) With intent to cause bodily injury or death to another person, he provokes the use of unlawful physical force by that other person; or
(b) He or she is the initial aggressor; except that his or her use of physical force upon another person under the circumstances is justifiable if he or she withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to the other person his or her intent to do so, but the latter nevertheless continues or threatens the use of unlawful physical force;
(c) The physical force involved is the product of a combat by agreement not specifically authorized by law; or
(d) The use of physical force against another is based on the discovery of, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the victim's actual or perceived gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation, including but not limited to under circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted nonforcible romantic or sexual advance toward the defendant. Nothing in this subsection (3)(d) precludes the admission of evidence, which is otherwise admissible, of a victim's or witness's conduct, behavior, or statements.
(4) In a case in which the defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction regarding self-defense as an affirmative defense, the court shall allow the defendant to present evidence, when relevant, that he or she was acting in self-defense. If the defendant presents evidence of self-defense, the court shall instruct the jury with a self-defense law instruction. The court shall instruct the jury that it may consider the evidence of self-defense in determining whether the defendant acted recklessly, with extreme indifference, or in a criminally negligent manner. However, the self-defense law instruction shall not be an affirmative defense instruction and the prosecuting attorney shall not have the burden of disproving self-defense. This section shall not apply to strict liability crimes.
(5) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) “Gender identity” and gender expression have the same meaning as in section 18-1-901(3)(h.5).
(b) “Intimate relationship” has the same meaning as in section 18-6-800.3.
(c) “Sexual orientation” has the same meaning as in section 18-9-121(5)(b).

(1) The general assembly hereby recognizes that the citizens of Colorado have a right to expect absolute safety within their own homes.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 18-1-704, any occupant of a dwelling is justified in using any degree of physical force, including deadly physical force, against another person when that other person has made an unlawful entry into the dwelling, and when the occupant has a reasonable belief that such other person has committed a crime in the dwelling in addition to the uninvited entry, or is committing or intends to commit a crime against a person or property in addition to the uninvited entry, and when the occupant reasonably believes that such other person might use any physical force, no matter how slight, against any occupant.
(3) Any occupant of a dwelling using physical force, including deadly physical force, in accordance with the provisions of subsection (2) of this section shall be immune from criminal prosecution for the use of such force.
(4) Any occupant of a dwelling using physical force, including deadly physical force, in accordance with the provisions of subsection (2) of this section shall be immune from any civil liability for injuries or death resulting from the use of such force.
(5) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires, “dwelling” does not include any place of habitation in a detention facility, as defined in section 18-8-211(4).

A person in possession or control of any building, realty, or other premises, or a person who is licensed or privileged to be thereon, is justified in using reasonable and appropriate physical force upon another person when and to the extent that it is reasonably necessary to prevent or terminate what he reasonably believes to be the commission or attempted commission of an unlawful trespass by the other person in or upon the building, realty, or premises. However, he may use deadly force only in defense of himself or another as described in section 18-1-704, or when he reasonably believes it necessary to prevent what he reasonably believes to be an attempt by the trespasser to commit first degree arson.

A person is justified in using reasonable and appropriate physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to prevent what he reasonably believes to be an attempt by the other person to commit theft, criminal mischief, or criminal tampering involving property, but he may use deadly physical force under these circumstances only in defense of himself or another as described in section 18-1-704.

A person is justified and exempt from criminal liability for criminal mischief, criminal trespass, or criminal tampering involving property if such action occurred when he or she rendered emergency assistance to an at-risk person or animal in a locked vehicle, provided the person rendering assistance acted in accordance with the provisions of section 13-21-108.4.

(1) Peace officers, in carrying out their duties, shall apply nonviolent means, when possible, before resorting to the use of physical force. A peace officer may use physical force only if nonviolent means would be ineffective in effecting an arrest, preventing an escape, or preventing an imminent threat of injury to the peace officer or another person.
(1.5)(a) Pursuant to section 18-8-805 (1) and (2)(a)(I), peace officers shall not use, direct, or unduly influence the use of ketamine upon another person nor compel, direct, or unduly influence an emergency medical service provider to administer ketamine. If a peace officer violates this prohibition, the district attorney may charge the officer with any crime based on the facts of the case.
(b) As used in this subsection (1.5), unless the context otherwise requires, “unduly influence” means the improper use of power or trust in a way that deprives a person of free will and substitutes another's objective.
(c) Notwithstanding subsection (1.5)(a) of this section, a peace officer who is also certified as an emergency medical service provider may administer ketamine pursuant to the restrictions set forth in section 25-3.5-209 and when the decision to administer ketamine is based on the emergency medical service provider's training and expertise.
(2) When physical force is used, a peace officer shall:
(a) Not use deadly physical force to apprehend a person who is suspected of only a minor or nonviolent offense;
(b) Use only a degree of force consistent with the minimization of injury to others;
(c) Ensure that assistance and medical aid are rendered to any injured or affected persons as soon as practicable; and
(d) Ensure that any identified relatives or next of kin of persons who have sustained serious bodily injury or death are notified as soon as practicable.
(2.5)(a) A peace officer is prohibited from using a chokehold upon another person.
(b)(I) As used in this subsection (2.5), “chokehold” means a method by which a person applies sufficient pressure to a person to make breathing difficult or impossible and includes but is not limited to any pressure to the neck, throat, or windpipe that may prevent or hinder breathing or reduce intake of air.
(II) “Chokehold” also means applying pressure to a person's neck on either side of the windpipe, but not to the windpipe itself, to stop the flow of blood to the brain via the carotid arteries.
(3) A peace officer is justified in using deadly physical force to make an arrest only when all other means of apprehension are unreasonable given the circumstances and:
(a) The arrest is for a felony involving conduct including the use or threatened use of deadly physical force;
(b) The suspect poses an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury to the peace officer or another person;
(c) The force employed does not create a substantial risk of injury to other persons.
(4) A peace officer shall identify himself or herself as a peace officer and give a clear verbal warning of his or her intent to use firearms or other deadly physical force, with sufficient time for the warning to be observed, unless to do so would unduly place peace officers at risk of injury or would create a risk of death or injury to other persons.
(4.5) Notwithstanding any other provision in this section, a peace officer is justified in using deadly force if the peace officer has an objectively reasonable belief that a lesser degree of force is inadequate and the peace officer has objectively reasonable grounds to believe, and does believe, that he or another person is in imminent danger of being killed or of receiving serious bodily injury.
(5) Except as provided in subsection (6) of this section, a person who has been directed by a peace officer to assist him to effect an arrest or to prevent an escape from custody is justified in using reasonable and appropriate physical force when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that force to be necessary to carry out the peace officer's direction, unless he knows that the arrest or prospective arrest is not authorized.
(6) A person who has been directed to assist a peace officer under circumstances specified in subsection (5) of this section may use deadly physical force to effect an arrest or to prevent an escape only when:
(a) He reasonably believes that force to be necessary to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly physical force; or
(b) He is directed or authorized by the peace officer to use deadly physical force and does not know, if that happens to be the case, that the peace officer himself is not authorized to use deadly physical force under the circumstances.
(7) A private person acting on his own account is justified in using reasonable and appropriate physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to effect an arrest, or to prevent the escape from custody of an arrested person who has committed an offense in his presence; but he is justified in using deadly physical force for the purpose only when he reasonably believes it necessary to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly physical force.
(8) A guard or peace officer employed in a detention facility is justified:
(a) In using deadly physical force when he reasonably believes it necessary to prevent the escape of a prisoner convicted of, charged with, or held for a felony or confined under the maximum security rules of any detention facility as such facility is defined in subsection (9) of this section;
(b) In using reasonable and appropriate physical force, but not deadly physical force, in all other circumstances when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to prevent what he reasonably believes to be the escape of a prisoner from a detention facility.
(9) “Detention facility” as used in subsection (8) of this section means any place maintained for the confinement, pursuant to law, of persons charged with or convicted of an offense, held pursuant to the “Colorado Children's Code”,1 held for extradition, or otherwise confined pursuant to an order of a court.
(10) Repealed by Laws 2020, Ch. 110 (S.B. 20-217), § 7, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

A person may not be convicted of an offense, other than a class 1 felony, based upon conduct in which he engaged at the direction of another person because of the use or threatened use of unlawful force upon him or upon another person, which force or threatened use thereof a reasonable person in his situation would have been unable to resist. This defense is not available when a person intentionally or recklessly places himself in a situation in which it is foreseeable that he will be subjected to such force or threatened use thereof. The choice of evils defense, provided in section 18-1-702, shall not be available to a defendant in addition to the defense of duress provided under this section unless separate facts exist which warrant its application.

The commission of acts which would otherwise constitute an offense is not criminal if the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was induced to do so by a law enforcement official or other person acting under his direction, seeking to obtain evidence for the purpose of prosecution, and the methods used to obtain that evidence were such as to create a substantial risk that the acts would be committed by a person who, but for such inducement, would not have conceived of or engaged in conduct of the sort induced. Merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense is not entrapment even though representations or inducements calculated to overcome the offender's fear of detection are used.

The issues of justification or exemption from criminal liability under sections 18-1-701 to 18-1-709 are affirmative defenses.

(1) A person is immune from arrest and prosecution for an offense described in subsection (3) of this section if:
(a) The person reports in good faith an emergency drug or alcohol overdose event to a law enforcement officer, to the 911 system, or to a medical provider;
(b) The person remains at the scene of the event until a law enforcement officer or an emergency medical responder arrives or the person remains at the facilities of the medical provider until a law enforcement officer arrives;
(c) The person identifies himself or herself to, and cooperates with, the law enforcement officer, emergency medical responder, or medical provider; and
(d) The offense arises from the same course of events from which the emergency drug or alcohol overdose event arose.
(2) The immunity described in subsection (1) of this section also extends to the person who suffered the emergency drug or alcohol overdose event if all of the conditions of subsection (1) of this section are satisfied.
(3) The immunity described in subsection (1) of this section applies to the following criminal offenses:
(a) Unlawful possession of a controlled substance, as described in section 18-18-403.5(2);
(b) Unlawful use of a controlled substance, as described in section 18-18-404;
(c) If committed on or after March 1, 2020, unlawful possession of two ounces or less of marijuana, as described in section 18-18-406(5)(a)(I) prior to its repeal in 2021; or more than two ounces of marijuana but not more than six ounces of marijuana or not more than three ounces of marijuana concentrate, as described in section 18-18-406(4)(c); or more than six ounces of marijuana or more than three ounces of marijuana concentrate, as described in section 18-18-406(4)(b);
(d) Open and public display, consumption, or use of less than two ounces of marijuana, as described in section 18-18-406(5)(b)(I);
(e) Transferring or dispensing two ounces or less of marijuana from one person to another for no consideration, as described in section 18-18-406(5)(c);
(f) Use or possession of synthetic cannabinoids or salvia divinorum, as described in section 18-18-406.1;
(g) Possession of drug paraphernalia, as described in section 18-18-428; and
(h) Illegal possession or consumption of ethyl alcohol or marijuana by an underage person or illegal possession of marijuana paraphernalia by an underage person, as described in section 18-13-122.
(4) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to prohibit the prosecution of a person for an offense other than an offense listed in subsection (3) of this section or to limit the ability of a district attorney or a law enforcement officer to obtain or use evidence obtained from a report, recording, or any other statement provided pursuant to subsection (1) of this section to investigate and prosecute an offense other than an offense listed in subsection (3) of this section.
(5) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires, “emergency drug or alcohol overdose event” means an acute condition including, but not limited to, physical illness, coma, mania, hysteria, or death resulting from the consumption or use of a controlled substance, or of alcohol, or another substance with which a controlled substance or alcohol was combined, and that a layperson would reasonably believe to be a drug or alcohol overdose that requires medical assistance.

(1) Legislative declaration. The general assembly hereby encourages the administration of opiate antagonists for the purpose of saving the lives of people who suffer opiate-related drug overdose events. A person who administers an opiate antagonist to another person is urged to call for emergency medical services immediately.
(2) General immunity. (a) A person, other than a health care provider or a health care facility, who acts in good faith to furnish or administer an opiate antagonist, including an expired opiate antagonist, to an individual the person believes to be suffering an opiate-related drug overdose event or to an individual who is in a position to assist the individual at risk of experiencing an opiate-related overdose event is immune from criminal prosecution for the act or for any act or omission made if the opiate antagonist is stolen.
(b) This subsection (2) also applies to:
(I) A law enforcement agency or first responder; an employee or volunteer of a harm reduction organization; a school district, school, or employee or agent of a school acting in accordance with section 12-30-110(1)(b), (2)(b), and (4)(b) and, as applicable, section 22-1-119.1; a mental health professional, as defined in section 12-30-110(7)(b.5); or a unit of local government, as defined in section 29-3.5-101(4); and
(II) A person who acts in good faith to furnish or administer an opiate antagonist in accordance with section 25-20.5-1001.
(3)(a) Licensed prescribers and dispensers. An individual who is licensed by the state under title 12 and is permitted by section 12-30-110 or by other applicable law to prescribe or dispense an opiate antagonist is immune from criminal prosecution for:
(I) Prescribing or dispensing an opiate antagonist in accordance with the applicable law; or
(II) Any outcomes resulting from the eventual administration of the opiate antagonist by a layperson.
(b) Repealed by Laws 2015, Ch. 78, § 9, eff. April 3, 2015.
(4) The provisions of this section shall not be interpreted to establish any duty or standard of care in the prescribing, dispensing, or administration of an opiate antagonist.
(5) Definitions. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) “Health care facility” means a hospital, a hospice inpatient residence, a nursing facility, a dialysis treatment facility, an assisted living residence, an entity that provides home- and community-based services, a hospice or home health care agency, or another facility that provides or contracts to provide health care services, which facility is licensed, certified, or otherwise authorized or permitted by law to provide medical treatment.
(b)(I) “Health care provider” means:
(A) A licensed or certified physician, nurse practitioner, physician assistant, or pharmacist; or
(B) A health maintenance organization licensed and conducting business in this state.
(II) “Health care provider” does not include a podiatrist, optometrist, dentist, or veterinarian.
(c) “Opiate” has the same meaning as set forth in section 18-18-102(21).
(d) “Opiate antagonist” means naloxone hydrochloride or any similarly acting drug that is not a controlled substance and that is approved by the federal food and drug administration for the treatment of a drug overdose.
(e) “Opiate-related drug overdose event” means an acute condition, including a decreased level of consciousness or respiratory depression, that:
(I) Results from the consumption or use of a controlled substance or another substance with which a controlled substance was combined;
(II) A layperson would reasonably believe to be an opiate-related drug overdose event; and
(III) Requires medical assistance.

(1) Except as provided in section 18-7-209, it is an affirmative defense to any charge, other than a class 1 felony, if the minor being charged proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she was, at the time of the offense:
(a) A victim of human trafficking of a minor for involuntary servitude pursuant to section 18-3-503 or human trafficking of a minor for sexual servitude pursuant to section 18-3-504; and
(b) Forced or coerced into engaging in the criminal act charged.

(1) Evidence of a victim's, defendant's, or witness's actual or perceived gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation offered in relation to an affirmative defense or pursuant to rule 404 of the Colorado rules of evidence may be admissible only at trial and shall not be admitted in any other proceeding except at a proceeding pursuant to subsection (2) of this section. At trial, evidence of a victim's, defendant's, or witness's actual or perceived gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation offered by any party in relation to an affirmative defense or pursuant to rule 404 of the Colorado rules of evidence is presumed to be irrelevant.
(2) In any criminal prosecution, if evidence of a victim's, defendant's, or witness's actual or perceived gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation is to be offered by any party at trial in relation to an affirmative defense or pursuant to rule 404 of the Colorado rules of evidence, the following procedures shall be followed:
(a) A written motion must be made at least thirty-five days prior to trial, unless later for good cause shown, to the court and to the opposing parties stating that the moving party has an offer of proof of the specific factual relevancy and materiality of evidence of a victim's, defendant's, or a witness's actual or perceived gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation;
(b) The written motion must be accompanied by an affidavit in which the offer of proof is stated;
(c) If the court finds that the offer of proof is sufficient, the court shall notify the other parties. If the prosecution stipulates to the facts contained in the offer of proof, the court shall rule on the motion based upon the offer of proof without an evidentiary hearing. Otherwise, the court shall set an in-camera hearing prior to trial. In the hearing, to the extent the facts are in dispute, the court may allow a presentation of the offer of proof, including but not limited to the presentation of witnesses.
(d) An in-camera hearing may be held during trial if evidence first becomes available at the time of the trial or for good cause shown;
(e) At the conclusion of the hearing, or by written order if no hearing is held, if the court finds that the evidence proposed to be offered regarding a victim's, defendant's, or a witness's actual or perceived gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation is relevant to a material issue to the case, the court shall order that evidence may be introduced and prescribe the nature of the evidence or questions to be permitted. The moving party may then offer evidence pursuant to the order of the court.
(f) All motions and supporting documents filed pursuant to this section must be filed under seal and may be unsealed only if the court rules the evidence is admissible and the case proceeds to trial. If the court determines that only part of the evidence contained in the motion is admissible, only that portion of the motion and supporting documents pertaining to the admissible portion may be unsealed.
(g) The court shall seal all court transcripts, digital or other recordings, and records of proceedings, other than minute orders, of a hearing held pursuant to this section. The court may unseal the transcripts, digital or other recordings, and records only if the court rules the evidence is admissible and the case proceeds to trial. If the court determines that only part of the evidence is admissible, only the portion of the hearing pertaining to the admissible evidence may be unsealed.
(3)(a) In any criminal prosecution, the court may, at any time upon motion of the prosecution or on the court's own motion, issue a protective order pursuant to the Colorado rules of criminal procedure concerning disclosure of information relating to the victim or witness. The court may, at any time upon motion of the defendant or on the court's own motion, issue a protective order pursuant to the Colorado rules of criminal procedure concerning disclosure of information relating to the defendant. The court may punish a violation of a protective order by contempt of court.
(b) The person who would be the subject of the protective order may object to the motion for a protective order.
(4) If evidence of a victim's, defendant's, or witness's actual or perceived gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation is admitted at trial, the court shall instruct the jury to not allow bias or any kind of prejudice based upon gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation to influence its decision. If admitted for a limited purpose, the court shall further instruct the jury as to the limited purpose or purposes for which the evidence is admitted and for which the jury may consider it.
(5) This section does not apply when evidence of a victim's actual or perceived gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation is offered in a criminal prosecution for a bias-motivated crime as described in section 18-9-121. In such prosecutions, the rules of evidence shall govern the admissibility of evidence of a victim's actual or perceived gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation.
(6) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) “Gender identity” and “gender expression” have the same meaning as in section 18-1-901(3)(h.5).
(b) “Intimate relationship” has the same meaning as in section 18-6-800.3.
(c) “Sexual orientation” has the same meaning as in section 18-9-121(5)(b).